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ABSTRACT
The Mundell—Fleming model of international macroeconomics originated
in the writings of Robert A. Mundell and J. Marcus Fleming in the early
1960s. The key contribution of the model has been a systematic analysis
of the role played by international capital mobility In determining the
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies under alternative exchange rate
regimes. During the ensuing quarter century, the model was extended in
various directions and is still the main "work horse" of traditional
open—economy macroeconomics.
This paper develops an exposition that integrates the various facets
of the model and incorporates its extensions into a unified analytical
framework. Attention is given to the distinction between short—run and
long—run effects of policies, the implication of debt and tax financing
of government expenditures, the role of the exchange rate regime In this
regard, and debt revaluation and trade—balance revaluation effects
associated with exchange rate changes. The resulting integration
clarifies the key economic mechanisms operating in the Mundell—Fleming
model and helps to identify Its limitations. Among these Is the neglect
of intertemporal budget constraints and of the consequences of forward—
looking behavior consistent with this constraint. The formulation in the
paper casts the model In a manner that facilitates comparisons with more
modern approaches. In so doing, the exposition provides a bridge between
the traditional and the more modern approaches to international
macroeconomics.
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This paper is an exposition of the Mundell—Fleming model of
international macroeconomics. The foundations of the model were laid a
quarter century ago in the classic writings of Robert A. Mundell (1960,
1961a, 1961b, 1963, 1964, collected in 1968) and J. Marcus Fleming (1962).
The key contribution of this model has been a systematic analysis of the
role played by international capital mobility in determining the
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies under alternative exchange rate
regimes. The analysis extended the simple version of the Keynesian
income—expenditure model developed by Machiup (1943) and Metzler (1942)
as well as the policy—oriented model developed by Meade (1951) to
economies open to international trade In both goods and financial assets.
Over the years the model has been extended in various directions and is
still the main "work horse" of traditional open—economy macroeconomics.
Noteworthy among such extensions are: a stock (portfolio) specification
of capital mobility by McKinnon (1969), Branson (1970), Floyd (1969) and
Frenkel and Rodriguez (1975); an analysis of debt—revaluation effects
induced by exchange rate changes by Boyer (1977) and Rodriguez (1979);
a long—run analysis by Rodriguez (1979); and an analysis of expectations
and exchange rate dynamics by Kouri (1976) and Dornbusch (1976). A
recent critical evaluation of the model is provided by Purvis (1985). 1/
1/ Expositions of the model for alternative exchange rate regimes and
for different degrees of international capital mobility are presented in
Swoboda and Dornbusch (1973) and Mussa (1979). The diagrammatic analysis
used in this paper builds in part on these two expositions. Recent
surveys of various open—economy—macroeconomic issues, discussed in the
context of this model, are contained in Frenkel and Mussa (1985) and
Kenen (1985). In addition, Marston (1985) surveys applications of the
model to the analysis of stabilization policies, and Obstfeld and Stockman
(1985) contains a survey of exchange rate dynamics in this and other
models. The most comprehensive treatment of the Mundell—Fletning model to
date is provided by Dornbusch (1980).—2—
The purpose of the present paper is to provide an exposition which
integrates the various facets of the model into a unified analytical
framework. Our specification of the model incorporates the various
extensions. Special focus is given to the distinction between short—run
and long—run consequences of policies, the implications of debt and tax
finance of government budget, and the role of the exchange rate regime in
this regard. The resulting integration clarifies the key economic
mechanisms operating in the Mundell—Fleming model and helps identify its
limitations. Our formulation casts the model in a way which facilitates
possible comparisons with more modern approaches. In so doing the
exposition provides a bridge between the traditional and the more modern
approaches to international macroeconomics.
The specification of the model is sufficiently general to permit
an analysis of a wide variety of macroeconomic policies. To conserve
on space, however, we choose to illustrate the working of the model by
focusing on the instrument of fiscal policy.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II outlines
the analytical framework. Section III deals with the operation of the
economic system under a fixed exchange rate regime. In this context we
first analyse the small—country case and then proceed to analyse the
two—country model of the interdependent world economy. Section IV
contains a parallel analysis appropriate for the flexible exchange rate
regime. Section V is an integrative summary and an overview of the
Mundell—Fleming model. To facilitate the exposition, the main analysis
is carried out diagrammatically. The Appendices that follow the text
contain algebraic derivations and a formal treatment of exchange—rate
expectations.—3—
II. The Analytical Framework
Consider a two—country model of the world economy. The two
countries are referred to as the home (domestic) country and the foreign
country. Each country produces a distinct commodity: the domestic
economy produces good x and the foreign economy produces good m. The
domestic level of output is denoted by Y and the foreign level of output
by Y. In specifying the behavioral functions It is convenient to focus
on the domestic economy. Accordingly the budget constraint is
(1) Z + Mt —B
=Pt(Yt—Tt)+ Mtl —Rt_iB_l
where B denotes the domestic—currency value of private sector's
one—period debt issued in period t, and Rt denotes one plus the rate of
interest. The right—hand side of equation (1) states that in each period,
t, the resources available to individuals are composed of disposable
income, Pt(Yt—Tt)——where the GDP deflator is domestic output Is
andtaxes are Tt——and the net value of assets carried over from period t—l.
The latter consist of money, Mt_i, net of debt commitment Rt_iB_l (where
the latter includes principal plus interest payments). For subsequent use
we denote these assets by At_i where
(2) At_i =Mt_i
—Rt_iB_i
The left—hand side of equation (1) indicates the uses of these resources
including nominal spending, Z, money holding, M, and bond holding, -Br.
In conformity with the original Mundell—Fleming formulation the GDP
deflator, P, is assumed to be fixed and is normalized to unity. In that
case nominal spending also equals real spending Et. Due to the absence—4—
of changes in prices we identify the real rate of interest, rt =Rt—1,
with the corresponding nominal rate of interest (we return to this issue
later where we analyze the implications of exchange rate changes).
Assuming that the various demand functions depend on the available




(4) Mt =M(Yt—Tt+ At_i, rt)
In specifying these functions we assume for simplicity that the marginal
propensities to spend and to hoard out of disposable income are the same
as the corresponding propensities to spend and hoard out of assets. A
similar specification underlies the demand for bonds which is omitted due
to the budget constraint. We assume that desired spending and money
holdings depend positively on available resources and negatively on the
rate of interest.
The domestic private sector is assumed to allocate its spending
between domestic goods, C,, and foreign goods, Cmt• The real value of
domestic spending, Et, is ÷ PmtCmt, where Pmt denotes the relative
price of good in in terms of good x. This relative price Is assumed to be
equalized across countries through international trade. The relative
share of domestic spending on good m (the foreign good) is denoted by
=PmtSnt/Et
The level of real government spending In period t, measured in terms
of own GDP, is denoted by Gt. Analogously to the private sector, the—5—
Government also allocates its spending between the two goods. Domestic
government spending on Importables (good m) is
A similar set of demand functions and government spending patterns
characterize the foreign economy whose variables are denoted by an
asterisk and its fixed GDP deflator, P*, is normalized to unity.
Analogously to the domestic economy the relative share of foreign private
spending on good x (the good produced by the home country) is denoted by
=Ct/pmtE;correspondingly, the foreign government spending share
on good x is 13r.
The relative price of good m in terms of good x, pt, which is
assumed to be equal across countries, can be written as mt =etP/Pt
where et is the nominal exchange rate expressing the price of the
foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency. The specification
of the equilibrium in the world economy depends on the exchange rate
regime. We start with the analysis of equilibrium under a fixed exchange
rate regime.
III. Capital Mobility with Fixed Exchange Rates
Equilibrium in the world economy necessitates that the markets for
goods, money and bonds clear. Under a fixed exchange rate, domestic and
foreign money (in their role as assets) are perfect substitutes. There-
fore, money—market equilibrium can be specified by a single equilibrium
relation stating that the world demand for money equals the world supply.
Likewise, the assumptions that bonds are internationally tradable assets
and that domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes imply that in
equilibrium the rate of return on domestic bonds, rt, equals the—6—
corresponding rate on foreign bonds, rft, and that bond—market equilibrium
can also be specified by a single equation pertaining to the unified world
bond market. These considerations imply that the world economy can be
characterized by four markets: the markets for domestic output, foreign
output, world money, and world bonds. By Wairas's Law the bond market
can be omitted from the equilibrium specification of the two—county model
of the world economy. Accordingly, the equilibrium conditions are
(5) (im)E(Yt —Tt+At_i,rt) +(1—)G+ + A_1,r) =
(6)mEt —Tt+At_i,rt) +1G + (l—)e?(Y+A_1,r) =eY
(7) M(Yt —Tt+At_i,rt) ÷ eM*(Y +A_1,rt) =M
where e denotes the fixed exchange rate expressing the price of foreign
currency in terms of domestic currency. To focus on the effects of the
domestic government policy, we assume in what follows that foreign
government spending and taxes are zero. The (predetermined) value of
foreign assets is measured in foreign—currency units so that
=Mt_i+Rt_1BPt_i/e.Due to the assumed fixity of the GDP
deflators, e also measures the relative price of importables in terms of
exportables. The world supply of money, measured in terms of domestic
goods (whose domestic—currency price is unity) is denoted by M. In
specifying equation (7) we assume that the government does not finance
its spending through money creation. This permits a focus on the pure
effects of fiscal policies.
The specification of the equilibrium system (5) —(7)embodies the
arbitrage condition by which rt =rftso that the yields on domestic and—7
foreign bonds are equal. This equality justifies the use of the same rate
of interest in the behavioral functions of the domestic and the foreign
economies. The system (5) —(7)determines the short—run equilibrium
values of domestic output, 'foreignoutput, Y, and the world rate
of interest, rt, for given (predetermined) values of domestic and foreign
net assets, At_i and A_1, and for given levels of government spending,
Gt, and taxes, Tt.
The international distribution of the given world money supply
associated with the short—run equilibrium is determined endogenously
according to the demands. Thus
(8) Mt =M(Yt—Tt+At_i,rt)
** **
(9) Mt =M(Yt +A....i,rt)
This equilibrium distribution of the world money supply obtains through
international asset swaps.
This formulation of the short—run equilibrium system reveals the
significant role played by international capital mobility. In the absence
of such mobility, the short—run equilibrium would have determined the
levels of domestic and foreign output from the goods—market equilibrium
conditions. Associated with these levels of outputs there would be
equilibrium monetary flows. These flows cease in the long run in which a
stationary equilibrium distribution of the world money supply obtains.
In contrast, the equilibrium system (5) —(7)shows that with perfect
• capital mobility equilibrium in the world money—market obtains through
instantaneous asset swaps involving exchanges of money for bonds. These
instantaneous stock adjustments are reflected in equation (7).—8—
1.Fiscal policies in a small country
To illustrate the effects of fiscal policies under a regime of
fixed exchange rates with perfect capital mobility, it is convenient to
begin with an analysis of a small country facing a given world rate of
interest, rf, and a given world demand for its goods, =E*.Under
these circumstances the equilibrium condition for the small economy
reduces to
(5') m(X7t —Tt+At_i,rf) +(1—&)G+ =
Thisequilibrium condition determines the short—run value of output for
the given (predetermined) value of assets and for given levels of govern-
ment spending and taxes. The money supply, Mt, associated with this
equilibrium is obtained from the money—market equilibrium condition (8').
Accordingly,
(8') M(Yt —Tt+At.....i,rf) =Mt
This quantity of money is endogenously determined through instantaneous
asset swaps at the prevailing world rate of interest.
To analyze the effects of fiscal policies we differentiate
equation (5'). Thus
dYt ____ (10) =
s+a for dTt =0
and
dYt
(11) =1— fordTt =dG—9—
where s and a denote, respectively, the domestic marginal propensities to
save and to import out of income (or assets) and where a =isthe
government marginal propensity to import, and 1/(s+a) is the small—country
foreign—trade multiplier. Equations (10) and (11) correspond,
respectively, to a bond—financed and to a tax—financed rise in government
spending. As is evident if all of government spending falls on domestic
goods (so that a =0),then the fiscal expansion which is financed by
government borrowing raises output by the full extent of the foreign
trade—multiplier, while the balanced—budget fiscal expansion yields the
closed—economy balanced—budget multiplier of unity. If, on the other
hand, all of government spending falls on imported goods (so that 3g =1),
then the bond—financed multiplier is zero whereas the balanced—budget
multiplier is negative and equal to (s+a—1)/(s+a).
The changes in output induce changes in the demand for money. The
induced changes in money holding can be found by differentiating
equation (8') and using (10) and (11). Accordingly, the debt—financed
unit rise in government spending raises money holdings by (1—a8)M/(s+a)
units where denotes the effect of a rise in income on money demand
(the inverse of the marginal income velocity). Likewise, the balanced—
budget rise in government spending lowers money holdings by aM/(s+a).
This analysis is summarized by Figure 1 in which the IS schedule
portrays the goods market equilibrium condition (5').It Is negatively
sloped since both a rise in the rate of interest and a rise in output
create an excess supply of goods. The initial equilibrium obtains at
point A at which the rate of interest equals the exogenously given world
rate, r, and the level of output Is Y0.Asindicated, the schedule IS— 9a —
Figure 1: The Short-Run Effects of Fiscal










isdrawn for given levels of government spending and taxes, G0 and T0.
The LM schedule passing through point A portrays the money—market
equilibrium condition (8'). It is positively sloped since a rise in
income raises the demand for money while a rise in the rate of interest
lowers money demand. As indicated, the LM schedule is drawn for a given
level of (the endogenously determined) money stock, M0.
A unit rise in government spending creates an excess demand for
domestic product (at the prevailing level of output). If it is bond
financed then the excess demand is 1—ag units, and if it is tax financed
then the excess demand is of s+a—ag units (which, depending on the
relative magnitudes of the parameters, may be negative). The excess
demand is reflected by a horizontal shift of the IS schedule from IS(G0)
to IS(G1). As drawn, the IS schedule shifts to the right, reflecting the
positive excess demand at the prevailing level of output. The new
equilibrium obtains at point B at which the level of output rises to Yj.
This higher level of output raises the demand for money which is met
instantaneously through an international swap of bonds for money that is
effected through the world capital markets. The endogenous rise in the
quantity of money from M to N1 is reflected in the corresponding
rightwards displacement of the LM schedule from LN(M0) to LM(M1).
The foregoing analysis determined the short—run consequences of an
expansionary fiscal policy. The instantaneous asset swap induced by the
requirement of asset—market equilibrium alters the size of the economy's
external debt. Specifically, if initially the economy was in a long—run




=Yti=Y),then the fiscal expansion which raises short—run money— 11—
holdingsas well as the size of the external debt, raises the debt—service
requirement and (in view of the positive rate of interest) lowers the
value of net assets Mt—(1+rf)B carried over to the subsequent period.
This change sets In motion a dynamic process that is completed only when
the economy reaches its new long—run equilibrium. We turn next to
determine the long—run consequences of government spending.
The long—run equilibrium conditions can be summarized by the system
(12) —(14):
(12) E(Y —T+M—(l+rf)B,rf) =Y—rfBP
—T
(13) (1_)E(Y —T÷ M —(l+rf)B,rf) +(1—8)G+e =Y
(14) M(Y —T+M—(l+rf)B,rf) =M
where the omission of the time subscripts Indicates that in the long run
the various variables do not vary over time. Equation (12) is obtained
from the budget constraint (1) by using the spending function from
equation (3) and by imposing the requirement that in the long run
Mt =Mt_iand B =B_1.This equation states that in the long run
private—sector spending equals disposable income, so that private—sector
savings are zero. Equation (13) is obtained from (5') and (8') together
with the long—run stationarity requirement. This equation is the long—run
market clearing condition for domestic output. Finally, equation (14),
which is the long—run counterpart to equation (8'), is the condition for
long—run money—market equilibrium.
Up to this point we have not incorporated explicitly the government
budget constraint. In the absence of money creation the long—run— 12—
governmentbudget constraint states that government outlays on purchases,
C, and debt service, rfB (where B denotes government debt), must equal
taxes, T. Accordingly,
(15) G+fB =T
Substituting this constraint into equation (12) yields
(12') E(Y —G+M—BP—rf(BP+B),rf) +G=Y—rf(BP+B)
Equation (12') states that in the long run the sum of private—sector and
government spending equals GNP. This equality implies that in the long
run the current account of the balance of payments is balanced.
Using equations (12), (14) and (15) we obtain the combinations of
output and debt that satisfy the long—run requirement of current account
balance as well as money—market equilibrium. These combinations are
portrayed along the CA =0schedule in Figure 2. Likewise, using
equations (13) —(15)we obtain the combinations of output and debt that
incorporate the requirements of goods and money—market equilibrium.
These combinations are portrayed along the YY schedule in Figure 2. The
slopes of these schedules are
dB (s_Mr)
(16) =—




= — — alongthe YY schedule
(l+rf)(l—s—a)Figure 2: The Long-RunEffects of













Yo Yl Y— 13—
Inthese equations, the term is the marginal propensity to hoard
(the inverse of the marginal income velocity) and s—Mr represents the
marginal propensity to save in the form of bonds. As is evident the
numerators in equations (16) —(17)are positive. The denominator of
equation (17) is positive since 1—s—a > 0 and the denominator of
equation (16) is positive on the assumption that (l—s) > i(s—My).The
latter assumption is a stability condition ensuring that the perpetual
rise in consumption (l—s) made possible by a unit rise in debt exceeds
the perpetual return on the saving in bonds rf(s—M) made possible by the
initial unit rise in debt. If this inequality does not hold then
consumption and debt rise over time and do not converge to a long—run
stationary equilibrium. The foregoing discussion Implies that the slopes
of both the CA =0and the YY schedules are negative. Further, since the
numerator of (17) exceeds the one in (16) and the denominator of (17) is
smaller than the one in (16), the YY schedule in Figure 2 is steeper than
the CA =0schedule. The initial long—run equilibrium Is indicated by
point A in Figure 2 in which the levels of output and private—sector debt
are Y0 and B6.
Consider the long—run effects of a debt—financed rise in government
spending. As is evident by inspection of the system (12) —(14),as
long as taxes remain unchanged, the CA =0(which is derived from
equations (12) and (14)) remains intact. On the other hand the rise in
government spending influences the YY schedule which is derived from
equations (13) —(14).Specifically, to maintain goods—market equilibrium
(for any given value of private—sector debt, BP) a unit rise in government
spending must be offset by (1—a)/(s+a) units rise in output. Thus, as— 14—
longas some portion of government spending falls on domestic goods so
that ag < 1, the YY schedule in Figure 2 shifts to the right. The new
equilibrium is indicated by point B at which the level of output rises
from to Y1 and private—sector debt falls to B. The new equilibrium
is associated with a rise in money holdings, representing the cumulative
surpluses in the balance of payments during the transition period.
A comparison between the short—run multiplier shown in equation (10)
and the corresponding long—run multiplier (shown in equation (A—7) of the
Appendix) reveals that the latter exceeds the former. In terms of
Figure 2, in the short run the output—effect of the debt—financed rise in
government spending is indicated by the point C whereas the corresponding
long—run equilibrium is indicated by point B.
Consider next the effects of a tax—financed rise in government
spending. Such a balanced—budget rise in spending alters the positions
of both the CA =0and the YY schedules. Using equations (12) and (14)
together with the balanced—budget assumption that dG =dTit can be shown
that a unit rise in government spending induces a unit rightward shift of
the CA =0schedule. By keeping the value of Y—T Intact and holding BP
constant, such a shift maintains the equality between private—sector
spending and disposable income and it also satisfies the money—market
equilibrium condition. Likewise using equations (13) and (14) together
with the balanced—budget assumption, it is shown in the Appendix that as
long as the government import propensity, a, Is positive, the U schedule
shifts to the right by less than one unit. The resulting new long—run
equilibrium is Indicated by point B In Figure 3. For the case drawn, the
long—run level of output falls from Y0 to Yj and private—sector debt rises— 14a —
Figure 3: The Long-Run Effects of a
Unit Balanced-Budget Rise in















fromB to B?. Since government debt remains unchanged, the rise in
private—sector debt corresponds to an equal rise in the economy's
external—debt position. In general, however, depending on the parameters,
domestic output may either rise or fall in the long run.
The size of the long—run multiplier of the balanced—budget rise in
government spending depends on the government import propensity. At the
limit, if all government spending falls on domestic output so that a =0,
the long—run balanced—budget multiplier is unity. In this case the YY
schedule in Figure 3 shifts to the right by one unit, the long—run level
of output rises by one unit, and private—sector debt (and the economy's
external debt) remains unchanged. At the other limit, if all government
spending falls on foreign goods so that a =1,the long—run balanced
budget multiplier is negative. In that case the rise in the economy's
external debt is maximized.
The comparison between the short—run balanced—budget multiplier
shown in equation (11) with the corresponding long—run multiplier (shown
in equation (A—b) of the Appendix) highlights the contrasts between the
two. If the government propensity to spend on domestic goods (1—ag)
equals the corresponding private—sector propensity (1—s—a), then the
short—run multiplier is zero while the long—run multiplier is negative.
On the other hand, if the government propensity (1—ag) exceeds the
private—sector propensity (1—s—a), both the short and the long—run
balanced budgets are negative, but the absolute value of the long—run
multiplier exceeds the corresponding short—run multiplier. Finally, if
government spending falls entirely on domestically produced goods (so
that ag =0),then the short—run and the long—run multipliers are equal
to each other and both are unity.— 16—
2.Fiscal policies in a two—country world
In this section we return to the two—country model outlined in
equations (5) —(7)and analyze the short—run effects of a debt and
tax—financed rise in government spending on the equilibrium levels of
domestic and foreign outputs as well as on the equilibrium world rate of
interest. The endogeneity of the last two variables distinguishes this
analysis from the one conducted for the small country case. To conserve
on space we do not analyze here the long—run effects; the formal system
applicable to the long—run equilibrium of the two—country world is
presented in Appendix 1.3.
The analysis is carried out diagrammatically with the aid of
Figures 4 and 5. In these figures the YY schedule portrays combinations
of domestic and foreign levels of output which yield equality between the
levels of production of domestic output and the world demand for it.
Likewise, the **scheduleportrays combinations of output that yield
equality between the level of production of foreign output and the world
demand for it. The two schedules incorporate the requirement of
equilibrium in the world money market. It is shown in the Appendix that
the slopes of these schedules are
dY* (s+a)(M ÷eM*)+ M H
(18) = r
—r Y r along the YY schedule





r r Y r along the Y*Y* schedule
dYt e (s*+a*)(Mr ÷eM)÷M;*FrFigure 4: A Unit Debt-Financed Rise
in Government Spending Under
Fixed Exchange Rates:
The Two-Country Case
Data: a* (Mr + e M*r) — M*. Hr < 0
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whereHr and Fr denote the partial (negative) effect of the rate of
Interest on the world demand for domestic and foreign outputs,
respectively, and where Er Mr E and M denote the partial (negative)
effects of the rate of Interest on domestic and foreign spending and money
demand. As may be seen the slopes of the two schedules may be positive
or negative. To gain intuition we note that in the special case for which
spending does not depend on the rate of interest (so that Hr =Fr=0)
both schedules must be positively sloped. If on the other hand the rate
of interest exerts a strong negative effect on world spending then the
excess supply induced by a rise in one country's output may have to be
eliminated by a fall in the other country's output. Even though this
fall in foreign output lowers directly the foreign demand for the first
country's exports, it also induces a decline In the world rate of interest
which indirectly stimulates spending and may more than offset the direct
reduction In demand. In that case market clearance for each country's
output Implies that domestic and foreign outputs are negatively related.
Even though the two schedules may be positively or negatively
sloped, it may be verified (and Is shown In the Appendix) that the YY
schedule must be steeper than the Y*Y* schedule. This restriction leaves
four possible configurations of the schedules. The common characteristic
of these configurations is that starting from an Initial equilibrium, if
there is a rightwards shift of the YY schedule which exceeds the
rIghtwards shift of the Y*Y* schedule, then the new equilibrium must be
associated with a higher level of domestic output.
Two cases capturing the general pattern of world—output allocations
are shown in Figures 4 and 5. The other possible configurations which— 18—
areomitted do not yield different qualitative results concerning the
effects of fiscal policies. In both figures the initial equilibrium is
indicated by point A at which the domestic level of output Is Y0 and the
foreign level is Y.
A debt—financed rise in government spending raises the demand for
domestic output and induces a rightwards shift of the TI schedule from YY
to YY'. On the other hand the direction of the change in the position of
the **scheduledepends on the relative magnitudes of the two
conflicting effects influencing world demand for foreign output. On the
one hand the rise in the domestic government spending raises the demand
for foreign goods but on the other hand the induced rise in the world
rate of interest lowers the demand. If the Y*Y* schedule is positively
sloped, as in Figure 4, then the rise in the domestic government spending
induces a leftwards (upwards) shift of the Y*Y* schedule. The opposite
holds if the Y*Y* schedule is negatively sloped as in Figure 5. The
formal expressions indicating the magnitudes of the displacements of the
schedules are provided in the Appendix.
The new equilibrium obtains at point B at which domestic output
rises from Y0 to Yj. In the case shown in Figure 4 (for which the
interest—rate effect on the world demand for foreign output is relatively
weak) foreign output rises. On the other hand in the case shown in
Figure 5 (for which the interest—rate effect on the world demand for
foreign output is relatively strong) foreign output may rise or fall
depending on the magnitude of the parameters, especially the composition
of government spending. For example, if government spending falls
entirely on domestic output (so that ag =0),the **scheduledoes not— 19—
shiftand the new equilibrium obtains at a point like point C in Figure 5
at which foreign output falls. In the other extreme, if government
spending falls entirely on foreign goods (so that ag =1)then the YY
schedule does not shift and the new equilibrium obtains at a point like
point D at which foreign output rises.
It is shown in the Appendix that, independent of the direction of
output changes, the debt—financed rise In government spending must raise
the world rate of interest. The expressions reported in the Appendix
also reveal that if the (negative) Interest—rate effect on the world
demand for domestic output is relatively strong, then domestic output
might fall. The balance of payments effects of the debt—financed rise
in government spending are not clear cut, reflecting "transfer—problem
criteria" familiar from the theory of international transfers. But, if
the behavioral parameters of the domestic and foreign private sectors are
equal to each other, then the balance of payments must improve and the
domestic money holdings are raised.
A tax—financed rise in government spending also alters the positions
of the various schedules as shown in the Appendix where we also provide
the formal expressions for the various multipliers. In general, in
addition to the considerations highlighted in the debt—financed case, the
effect of a tax—financed fiscal spending also reflects the effects of the
reduction in domestic disposable income on aggregate demand. This effect
may more than offset the influence of government spending on domestic
output. The effect on foreign output is also modified. [f the interest—
rate effect on world demand for foreign output is relatively weak (the
case underlying Figure 4), then the shift from a debt to a tax—finance— 20—
mitigatesthe expansion in foreign output. If on the other hand the
interest—rate effect on the demand for foreign output is relatively
strong (the case underlying Figure 5) then the shift from debt to tax
finance exerts expansionary effects on foreign output.
It is shown in the Appendix that the direction of the change in the
rate of interest induced by the tax—financed rise in government spending
depends on a "transfer—problem criterion" indicating whether the
redistribution of world disposable income consequent on the fiscal policy
raises or lowers the world demand for money. Accordingly, the rate of
interest rises if the domestic—country ratio, S/My, exceeds the
corresponding foreign—country ratio, s*/M*, and vice versa. Independent,
however, of the change in the rate of interest, the tax—financed rise in
government spending must deteriorate the domestic—country balance of
payments and reduce its money holdings.
IV. Capital Mobility with Flexible Exchange Rates
In this section we assume that the world economy operates under a
flexible exchange—rate regime. With this assumption national moneys
become nontradable assets whose relative price (the exchange rate,e) is
assumed to be determined freely in the world market for foreign exchange.
We continue to assume that in each country, the GDP deflators, P and *,
arefixed and equal to unity. Under such circumstances the nominal
exchange rates represent the terms of trade and the nominal rates of
interest in each country equal the corresponding (GDP—based) real rates.
Further, as was traditionally postulated in the early literature on
modeling macroeconomic policies in the world economy, we start the
analysis by assuming that exchange rate expectations are static. Under— 21—
suchcircumstances the international mobility of capital brings about
equality among national (GDP—based) real rates of interest. We return
to the issue of exchange rate expectations in a subsequent section.
Equilibrium in the world economy requires that world demand for each
country's ouput equals the corresponding supply and that in each country
the demand for cash balances equals the supply. Accordingly, the system




÷ 1G +et(1_)E*(Y+A_1,rt) =etY
(22) M(Yt —+ At_i,rt) =M
(23) M*(Y +At_i,rt) =M*
Equations (20) —(21)are the goods—market equilibrium conditions
(analogous to equations (5) —(6)),and equations (22) —(23)are the
domestic and foreign money—market equilibrium conditions where M and
M* denote the supplies of domestic and foreign money. In contrast with
the fixed exchange rate system in which each country's money supply was
determined endogenously, here it is determined exogenously by the
monetary authorities. We also note that by Walras's Law the world
market equilibrium condition for bonds has been left out.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the value of securities may be
expressed in terms of domestic or foreign currency units. Accordingly,—22 —
thedomestic—currency value of private—sector debt, B, can be expressed
in units of foreign currency to yield Bt =BPt/et.Arbitrage ensures
that the expected rates of return on securities of different currency
denomination are equalized. Accordingly, if rt and rft are, respectively,
the rates of interest on domestic and foreign—currency denominated bonds
then l+rt =(at+l/et)O.÷rft)where denotes the expected future
exchange rate. By equating rt to rft the system (20) —(22)embodies the
assumption of static exchange rate expectations and perfect capital
mobility. In Appendix 11.3 we return to the issue of exchange rate
expectations.
1.Fiscal pclicies in a small country
Analogously with our procedure in the analysis of fiscal policies
under fixed exchange rates we start the analysis of flexible exchange
rates with an examination of the effects of fiscal policies in a small
country facing a given world rate of interest, r, and a given foreign
demand for its goods, D*. The equilibrium conditions for the small
country state that world demand for Its output equals domestic GDP and
that the domestic demand for money equals the supply. In contrast with
the situation prevailing under a fixed exchange rate regime where the
monetary authorities, committed to peg the exchange rate, do not control
the domestic money supply, under a flexible exchange rate regime the
supply of money is a policy instrument controlled by the monetary
authorities.
The goods and money—markets equilibrium conditions are
(20') mt —Tt÷ As_i, rf) ÷ (1—)G +et
=Yt
(22') M(Yt —Tt÷ At_i, rf) =M— 23—
where At_i =Mt_i
—(l+rf)etB,_l.
As indicated, the valuation of the foreign—currency denominated debt
commitment, (l+rf)B,t_l, employs the current exchange rate, et. These
equilibrium conditions determine the short—run values of output and the
exchange rate and for comparison we recall that under the fixed exchange
rate regime the money supply rather than the exchange rate was
endogenously determined.
The equilibrium of the system is exhibited in Figure 6. The
downwards sloping IS schedule shows the goods—market equilibrium
condition (2O). It is drawn for given values of government spending,
taxes, and the exchange rate (representing the terms of trade). The
upwards sloping LM schedule portrays the money—market equilibrium
condition (22'). It is drawn for given values of the money supply, the
exchange rate and taxes. The initial equilibrium obtains at point A at
which the rate of interest equals the world rate, r, and the level of
output is Y0. The endogenously—determined exchange rate associated with
this equilibrium is eo. It is relevant to note that In this system If
the Initial debt B,t....i is zero, the LM schedule does not depend on the
exchange rate and the level of output is determined exclusively by the
money—market equilibrium condition whereas (given the equilibrium level
of output) the equilibrium exchange rate is determined by the goods—market
equilibrium condition. This case underlies Figure 6. Again a comparison
with the fixed exchange—rate system is relevant. There, the equilibrium
money stock is determined by the money—market equilibrium condition
whereas the equilibrium level of output is determined by the goods—market
equilibrium condition.— 23a —
Figure 6: The Short-Run Effects of













Considerthe effects of a debt—financed unit rise in government
spending from G0 to G1 and suppose that the initial debt commitment is
zero. At the prevailing levels of output and the exchange rate, this
rise in spending creates an excess demand for domestic output and induces
a rightwards shift of the IS schedule by (1—a)/(s+a) units. This shift
is shown In Figure 6 by the displacement of the IS schedule from the
initial position indicated by IS(G0, T0, e0) to the position indicated
by IS(G1, T0, e0). Since with zero initial debt the LM schedule is
unaffected by the rise in government spending, it is clear that given the
world rate of interest the level of output that clears the money market
must remain at Y0 corresponding to the initial equilibrium indicated by
point A. To restore the initial equilibrium in the goods market the
exchange rate must fall (that is, the domestic currency must appreciate).
The induced improvement in the ternis of trade lowers the world demand for
domestic output and induces a leftwards shift of the IS schedule. The
goods market clears when the exchange rate falls to e1 so that the IS
schedule indicated by IS(G1, T0, ei) also goes through point A. We
conclude that under flexible exchange rates with zero initial debt a
debt—financed fiscal policy loses its potency to alter the level of
economic activity; its full effects are absorbed by changes in the
exchange rate (the terms of trade).
Consider next the effects of a tax—financed unit rise in government
spending from G0 to C1, shown in Figure 7. In that case, at the
prevailing levels of output and the exchange rate, the excess demand for
domestic output induces a rightwards displacement of the IS schedule by
1_a/(s+a) units to the position indicated by IS(G1, T1, e0). In addition,Figure 7: The Short-Run Effects of
















Yo Yl 'it— 25—
theunit rise in taxes lowers disposable income by one unit and reduces.
the demand for money. To maintain money—market equilibrium at the given
world rate of interest the level of output must rise by one unit so as to
restore the initial level of disposable income. Thus, the LM schedule
shifts to the right from its initial position indicated by LM(M0, To) to
the position indicated by LM(M0, T1). With a zero level of initial debt
(the case assumed in the figure), the LM schedule does not depend on the
value of the exchange rate and the new equilibrium obtains at point B
where the level of output rises by one unit from Y0 to Y1. Since at the
initial exchange rate the horizontal displacement of the IS schedule Is
less than unity (as long as government spending falls in part on imported
goods) it follows that at the level of output which clears the money—market
there is an excess supply of goods. This excess supply Is eliminated
through a rise In the exchange rate (that is, a depreciation of the
domestic currency) from e0 to e1. This deterioration in the terms of
trade raises the world demand for domestic output and induces a rightwards
shift of the IS schedule to the position indicated by IS(G1, T1, e1). We
conclude that under flexible exchange rates with zero initial debt the
tax—financed rise in government spending regains its full potency in
effecting the level of economic activity.
Up to this point we have assumed that the initial debt position was
zero. As a result, the only channel through which the exchange rate
influenced the system was through altering the domestic—currency value of
the exogenously given foreign demand, D*. In general, however, with a
non—zero level of initial debt, (denominated in units of foreign
currency), the change in the exchange rate also alters the domestic— 26—
currencyvalue of the initial debt and, thereby, of the initial assets,
At_i. The revaluation of the debt commitment constitutes an additional
channel through which the exchange rate influences the economic system.
As a result, the demand for money and thereby the LM schedule also depend
on the exchange rate.
To appreciate the role played by debt—revaluation effects we examine
in Figure 8 the implications of a non—zero level of initial debt. The
various IS and 114 schedules shown in the Figure correspond to alternative
assumptions concerning the level of initial debt and the rest of
the arguments governing the position of the schedules are suppressed for
simplicity. The initial equilibrium is shown by point A and the solid
schedules along which B,t....l =0corresponds to the cases analyzed in
Figures 6 and 7. With a positive value of initial debt a rise in the
exchange rate lowers the value of assets and lowers the demand for money.
Restoration of money—market equilibrium requires a compensating rise in
output. As a result the LM in that case is positively sloped. By a
similar reasoning a negative value of initial debt corresponds to a
from point A to point B if the level of initial debt is zero, to point C
negatively sloped LM
the slope of the IS
considerations, the
(around point A) if
We can now use
of the initial debt
expansion induces a
LM schedule intact.
schedule. The level of initial debt also influences
schedule. As shown in the Figure, using similar
IS schedule is steeper than the benchmark schedule
> 0, and vice versa.
this Figure to illustrate the possible implications
position. For example, a debt—financed fiscal
rightward shift of the IS schedule and leaves the
The short—run equilibrium of the system is changedFigure 8: The Short-Run Effects of
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ifthe level of initial debt is positive, and to point D if this level is
negative. Thus, the debt revaluation effects critically determine
whether a debt—financed rise in government spending is contractionary or
expansionary.
Using the system (20') and (22'), the changes in the level of output
are
dYt (l_a)(l+f)Bp_1 (24) — fordTt =0
(l+rf)B,_l —
dY a(l+rf)Bp t—l (25) — 1— ' fordTt =dG dG
(l+rf)B,_l —
Likewise,the induced changes in the exchange rates are





— fordTt =dG dG
(l+rf)B,_l -D*
These results highlight the role played by the debt—revaluation
effect of exchange rate changes. Specifically, as is evident from
equations (24) —(25)a rise in government spending may be contractionary
if the initial debt commitment is positive. If, however, the private
sector is initially a net creditor then, independent of its means of
finance, government spending must be expansionary. In the benchmark case— 28—
shownin Figures 6 and 7, the initial debt position is zero, a tax finance
is expansionary (yielding the conventional balanced—budget multiplier of
unity), and a debt finance is not. The key mechanism responsible for this
result is the high degree of capital mobility underlying the fixity of the
rate of interest faced by the small country. With the given rate of
interest and with a given money supply, there is in the short run a unique
value of disposable Income that clears the money market as long as the
initial debt commitment is zero. Hence, in this case, a rise in taxes is
expansionary and a rise in government spending is neutral.
A comparison between the exchange rate effects of government spending
also reveals the critical importance of the means of finance and of the
debt—revaluation effect. In general, for the given money supply, the
direction of the change in the exchange rate induced by a rise in govern-
ment spending depends on whether the government finances Its spending
through taxes or through debt issue. If the initial debt commitment
falls short of the (exogenously given) foreign demand for domestic output,
then a debt—financed rise in government spending appreciates the currency
while a tax—financed rise in government spending depreciates thecurrency.
The opposite holds if the initial debt commitment exceeds exports.
The foregoing analysis determined the short—run effects of government
spending. We proceed to analyze the long—run effects of these policies.
The long—run equilibrium conditions are shown in equations (28) —(30)
below. These equations are the counterpart to the long—run fixed
exchange rate system (12) —(14).Accordingly,
(28) E(Y —T+ M —(l+f)eB,rf) =Y—ifeB
—T— 29—
(29) (l—)E(Y —T÷ M —(l+f)eB,rf) +(1—)G+ei5* =
(30) M(Y —T÷ M —(l+rf)eB,rf) =M
To set the stage for the analysis, consider first the bench—mark case for
which the initial equilibrium was associated with a zero private—sector
debt. For this case the long run is analyzed in Figure 9. The CA =0
schedule portrays combinations of private—sector debt and output which
yield equality between spending and income, and thereby satisfying
equation (28). In view of the government budget constraint shown in
equation (15), this equality between private—sector income and spending
also implies current account balance. The MM schedule portrays
combinations of debt and output which yield money market equilibrium, and
thereby satisfy equation (30). Around zero private—sector debt, both of
these schedules are independent of the exchange rate. The slope of the
CA =0schedule is —s/e(1—s(l+rf)). Analogously to the previous
discussion of the long—run equilibrium under fixed exchange rates, this
slope is assumed negative for stability. The slope of the MM schedule is
l/(l+rf)e. It indicates that a unit rise in long—run private sector debt
raises debt commitment (principal plus debt service) by (l+f)e and lowers
the demand for money. To offset the reduction in disposable resources and
restore the demand for money to its initial level, output must be
raised by (l+rf)e units.
The initial long—run equilibrium is shown by point A at which the
level of private—sector debt is assumed to be zero and the level of
output is Yo. As is evident from equations (28) and (30), changes in the
levels of government spending and government debt do not alter the CA =0rP0
— 29a —
Figure 9: The Long-Run Effects of
A Unit Rise in Government Spending























scheduleand the MM schedule. It follows that with zero private—sector
debt a debt—financed rise in government spending does not alter the
long—run equilibrium value of private sector debt indicated by point A in
Figure 9. In this long—run equilibrium the level of output remains
unchanged and the currency appreciates to the level shown in the short—run
analysis of Figure 6.
A rise in taxes alters both the CA =0and the NM schedules. As is
evident from equations (28) and (30) a rise in output which keeps dispos-
able income unchanged (at the given zero level of private—sector debt)
maintains the initial current account balance as well as money—market
equilibrium intact. Thus, a tax—financed unit rise in government spending
induces a unit rightwards displacement of both the CA =0and the MM
schedules and yields a new long—run equilibrium at point B. At this
point private—sector debt remains at its initial zero level. Also, the
level of output rises to Y1 and the currency depreciates to e1 as shown
in the short—run analysis of Figure 7.
The above discussion shows that under flexible exchange rates with
zero initial private—sector debt the long—run and the short—run effects
of fiscal policies coincide. This characteristic is in contrast to the
one obtained for fixed exchange rates where the long—run effects of fiscal
policies differ from the corresponding short—run effects. In interpreting
these results we note that due to the non—tradability of national monies
under a flexible exchange rate regime, the mechanism of adjustment to
fiscal policies does not permit instantaneous changes in the composition
of assets through swaps of interest bearing assets for national money in
the world capital markets. As a result the only mechanism by which— 31—
private—sectordebt can change is through savings. Since with zero initial
private—sector debt both debt—financed and tax—financed government spending
do not alter disposable income (as seen from equations (24) —(25)),it
follows that these policies do not affect private—sector saving.Hence,
if the initial position was that of a long—run equilibrium with zero
savings and zero debt, the instantaneous short—run equilibrium following
the rise in government spending is also characterized by zerosavings.
This implies that the economy converges immediately to its newlong—run
equilibrium.
The foregoing analysis of the long—run consequences ofgovernment
spending abstracted from the debt—revaluation effect arising from exchange
rate changes. In general, if in the initial equilibrium the level of
private—sector debt differs from zero, then the debt—revaluation effect
breaks the coincidence between the short and the long—run fiscal policy
multipliers. Using the system (28) —(30),the long—run effects of a
debt—financed rise in government spending are
dY
(31) =0 for dT =0
dB ________ (32) =
— fordT=0
eD*
de (1—a ) (33) =—
— fordT=0
D*
Likewise, the long—run effects of a balanced—budget rise in government
spending are— 32—
(34) =1 for dT =dG




These results show that, independent of the debt—revaluation effects,
a rise in government spending does not alter the long—run level of output
if it is debt—financed while the same rise in government spending raises
the long—run level of output by a unit multiplier if it is tax financed.
Thus, in both cases the long—run level of disposable income, Y—T, is
independent of government spending. The results also show that if
government spending is debt financed then, in the long run, if initial
private sector debt was positive, then it rises while the currency
appreciates. The opposite holds for the case in which government spending
are tax financed.
In comparing the extent of the long—run changes in private—sector
debt with the corresponding changes in the exchange rate we note that the
value of debt, eB (measured in units of domestic output) remains
unchanged. This invariance facilitates the interpretation of the long—run
multipliers. Accordingly, consider the long—run equilibrium system
(28) —(30)and suppose that government spending is debt financed. In
that case as is evident from the money—market equilibrium condition (30),
the equilibrium level of output does not change as long as the money
supply, taxes, and the value of the debt commitment are given. Since,
however, the rise in government spending creates an excess demand for— 33—
domesticoutput, it is seen from equation (29) that the currency must
appreciate (that is, e must fall) so as to lower the value of foreign
demand, e, and thereby maintain equilibrium output unchanged. Obviously,
since e falls, (the absolute value of) private sector debt, B, must rise
by the same proportion so as to maintain the product eB unchanged.
Finally, these changes ensure that the zero saving condition (28) is also
satisfied. A similar interpretation can be given to the effects of a
tax—financed rise in government spending except that in this case the
level of output rises in line with the rise in taxes so as to keep
disposable income unchanged.
A comparison between these long—run effects and the corresponding
short—run effects shown in equations (24) —(25)reveals that the relative
magnitudes of these multipliers depend on the initial debt position. For
example, if the Initial debt commitment is positive but smaller than
export earnings, then the short—run multiplier of tax—finance is positive
and larger than unity. In this case the long—run multipliers are more
moderate than the corresponding short—run multipliers. If, however, the
initial debt commitment exceeds export earnings, then the short—run debt—
finance multiplier is positive (in contrast with the long—run multiplier)
and the short—run tax—finance multiplier is smaller than unity, and could
even be negative (in contrast with the unitary long—run balanced—budget
multiplier).
2.Fiscal policies in a two—country world
In this section we extend the analysis of the small—country case to
the two—country model outlined in equations (20) —(23).To develop a
diagrammatic apparatus useful for the- analysis of fiscal policies we— 34—
proceedin three steps. First, we trace the combinations of domestic
and foreign output levels which clear each country's goods market,
incorporating the conditions of market clearing in the two national money
markets (which under flexible exchange rates are the two non—tradable
assets). Second, we trace the combinations of domestic and foreign output
levels which bring about money—market equilibrium in each country and, at
the same time, yield equality between the domestic and the foreign rates
of interest, thereby conforming with the assumption of perfect capital
mobility. Finally, in the third step, we find the unique combination of
domestic and foreign levels of output which satisfy simultaneously the
considerations underlying the first two steps.
Using the domestic money—market equilibrium condition (22) we can
express the domestic money—market clearing rate of interest, rt, as a posi-
tive function of disposable resources, t —+ At_i,and as a negative
function of the domestic money stock, M, that is, rt =r(Yt—Tt+At_i,M).
Applying a similar procedure to the foreign country, we can express
the foreign money—market clearing rate of interest, r, as a
function of foreign disposable resources and money stock that is,
r =r*(Y+A1,M*), where =M1+Rt_iB_i/et.By substituting
these money—market clearing rates of interest into the goods market
equilibrium conditions (20) —(21),we obtain the reduced—form equilibrium
conditions (37) —(38).
(37) (l_m)E(Yt_Tt+At.....i M) +(1—ag)G +etE*(Y+A_1, M*) =y
(38)mYt_Ttt_1 M) ++ e(1_)E*(Y+A1,M*) =eY— 35—
wherea tilde (--)indicatesa reduced—form function incorporating the
money—market equilibrium conditions. For each and every value of the
exchange rate, et, equations (37) —(38)yield the equilibrium combination
of domestic and foreign output which clear the world markets for both
goods. The schedule ee in Figure 10 traces these equilibrium output
levels for alternative values of the exchange rate. The detailed
derivation of this schedule is provided In the Appendix where it is shown
that around balanced—trade equilibria with a zero initial private—sector
debt (so that exchange rate changes do not exert revaluation effects) this
schedule is negatively sloped. In general the ee schedule Is negatively
sloped if a rise In the exchange rate (a deterioration in the terms of
trade) raises the world demand for domestic output and lowers the world
demand for foreign output, allowing for the proper adjustments In each
country's rate of interest so as to clear the national money market.
So far we have not yet incorporated the constraints imposed by the
perfect international mobility of capital. To incorporate this constraint
the two national money—market clearing rates of interest,rt and r, must
equal each other. This equally implies that
(39) r(Yt —Tt+At_i,M) =r*(Y+ M*).
The combinations of domestic and foreign output levels conforming with
the perfect capital—mobility requirement are portrayed by the rr* schedule
in Figure 10. With a zero level of initial debt (so that the debt
revaluation effects induced by exchange rate changes are absent) this
schedule Is positively sloped since a rise in domestic output raises the
demand for domestic money and raises the domestic rate of interest;—Ii
— Jo
- 35a—
Figure 10: A Debt-Financed Unit














internationalinterest rate equalization is restored through a rise in
foreign output which raises the foreign demand for money and the foreign
rate of interest.
The short—run equilibrium is indicated by point A in Figure 10. At
this point both goods markets clear, both national money markets clear
and the rates of interest are equalized internationally. The levels of
output corresponding to this equilibrium are and Y.
A debt—financed unit rise in government spending alters the position
of the goods market equilibrium schedule ee but does not impact on the
capital—market equilibrium schedule, rr*. It is shown in the Appendix
that for an initial trade—balance equilibrium with zero debt the
ee schedule shifts to the right by 1/ units. The new equilibrium is
indicated by point B in Figure 10. Thus (in the absence of revaluation
effects), in the new short—run equilibrium both the domestic and the
foreign levels of output rise from Y0 and Y to Y1 and Y, respectively.
For the given supply of money and for the higher level of output
(which raises the demand for money), money—market equilibrium obtains at
a higher rate of interest (which restores money demand to its initial
level). Finally, it is shown in the Appendix that the exchange rate
effects of the debt—financed rise in government spending are not clear
cut, reflecting "transfer—problem criteria." These criteria reflect the
relative pressures on the rates of interest in the domestic and foreign
money markets induced by the changes in world demand for domestic and
foreign outputs. If these pressures tend to raise the domestic rate of
interest above the foreign rate, then the domestic currency must
appreciate so as to lower the demand for domestic output and reduce the— 37—
upwardpressure on the domestic rate of interest. The opposite follows
in the converse circumstances. But, if the behavioral parameters of the
two private sectors are equal to each other, then the domestic currency
must appreciate.
A tax—financed unit rise in government spending alters the position
of both the ee and the rr* schedules. As is evident by inspection of
equations (37) —(39)both schedules shift to the right by one unit.
This case is illustrated in Figure 11 where the initial equilibrium is
indicated by point A and the new short—run equilibrium by point B. At
the new equilibrium the domestic level of output rises by one unit so
that disposable income remains unchanged. With unchanged levels of
disposable income the demand for money is not altered and the initial
equilibrium rate of interest remains intact. As a result the initial
equilibrium in the foreign economy is not disturbed and the foreign
level of output remains unchanged. Finally, in order to eliminate the
excess supply in the domestic—goods market arising from the rise in
domestic output and the unchanged level of disposable income, the currency
must depreciate so as to raise the domestic—currency value of the given
foreign demand. It follows that in the absence of revaluation effects
the flexible exchange rate regime permits a full insulation of the foreign
economy from the consequences of the domestic tax—financed fiscal policies.
The more general results allowing for revaluation effects are provided in
the Appendix. Analogously to the procedure adopted in the fixed exchange
rate case, we do not analyze explicitly the long—run equilibrium of the
two—country world under the flexible exchange rate regime. The formal
equilibrium system applicable for such an analysis is presented in
Appendix 11.2.It
— 37a —























In this paper we analyzed the effects of government spending under
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in an exposition of the Mundell—
Fleming model. Throughout we have assumed that the world capital markets
are highly integrated so that capital is perfectly mobile internationally.
To conserve on space we have focused on the pure effects of fiscal
policies and assumed that there is no active monetary policy. In
particular we abstracted from money—financed government spending.
Accordingly, we analyzed the predictions of the Mundell—Fleming model
concerning short— and long—run consequences of debt—financed and of
tax—financed changes in government spending. In this context we focused
on the effects of fiscal policies on the levels of output, debt and the
rate of interest under the two alternative exchange rate regimes. In
addition, for the fixed exchange rate regime we examined the induced
changes in the money supply and, for the flexible exchange rate regime we
determined the induced change in the exchange rate.
The short— and long—run effects of a unit debt—financed and tax—
financed rise in government spending for a small country facing a fixed
world rate of interest are summarized in Table 1. This table shows the
various multipliers applicable to the fixed as well as to the flexible
exchange—rate regimes. The output multipliers under the fixed exchange
rate regime are the typical simple text—book version of the foreign trade
multipliers. These results are of course expected since the rate of
interest is exogenously given to the small country. The fixity of the
rate of interest implies that the typical crowding—out mechanism induced
by changes in the rate of interest are not present.— 39—
Table1. The Short— and Long—Run Effects of a Unit Rise in Government Spending

















































Note: D* denotes export earnings measured in units of foreign currency, Rf =l+rfand
A =a—rf(s—M).A > 0 under the assumption that a rise in income worsens the current
account of the balance of payments. The term l—s—rf(s—M) > 0 for stability.— 40—
Underflexible exchange rates the short—run output multipliers of
fiscal policies depend crucially on the debt—revaluation effect induced
by exchange rate changes. Indeed, in the absence of such an effect
(as would be the case if the initial debt position is zero), fiscal
policies lose their capacity to alter disposable income. Accordingly,
with debt finance the output multiplier is zero and with tax finance
the corresponding multiplier is unity. In general, however, the signs
and magnitudes of the short—run output multipliers depend on the size of
the initial debt. In contrast, these considerations do not influence the
long—run output multipliers. As seen in the table, with perfect capital
mobility and flexible exchange rates, the long—run value of disposable
income cannot be affected by fiscal policies.
One of the important points underscored by the results reported in
Table 1 is the critical dependence of the direction of change in the key
variables on the means of fiscal finance. Specifically, a shift from a
debt finance to a tax finance reverses the signs of the multipliers of
B, M and e.
For example, a tax—financed rise in government spending under a
fixed exchange rate regime induces a balance of payments deficit and
reduces both the short— and the long—run money holdings. On the other
hand a similar rise in government spending which is debt—financed induces
a surplus in the balance of payments and raises money holdings in the
short run as well as in the long run. Likewise, under a flexible
exchange rate regime the tax—financed rise in government spending
depreciates the long—run value of the currency whereas the debt—financed
rise in government spending appreciates the long—run value of the currency.— 41—
Asindicated earlier, a similar reversal in the direction of the change
in the exchange rate also pertains to the short run but whether the
currency depreciates or appreciates in the short run depends on the size
of the debt which in turn governs the debt—revaluation effect.
To study the characteristics of the international transmission
mechanism our exposition of the Mundell—Fleming model was extended to a
two—country model of the world economy. The new channel of transmission
is the world rate of interest which is determined in the unified world
capital market. Table 2 summarizes the short—run effects of fiscal
policies under the two alternative exchange rate regimes. To avoid a
tedious taxonomy the summary results for the flexible exchange rates
reported in the table are confined to the case in which the twin
revaluation effects—debt revaluation and trade balance revaluation——
induced by exchange rate changes are absent; accordingly it is assumed
that the initial debt is zero and that the initial equilibrium obtains
with a balanced trade.
As shown, independent of the exchange rate regime, a debt—financed
rise in government spending raises the world rate of interest. Under
the flexible exchange rate regime the debt—financed rise in government
spending stimulates demand for both domestic and foreign goods and
results in an expansion of both outputs. Thus, in this case, the inter-
national transmission of the rise in goververnment spending, measured by
co—movements of domestic and foreign outputs, is positive. On the other
hand, under a fixed exchange rate regime the rise in the world rate of
interst may offset the direct effect of government spending on aggregate
demand and may result in lower levels of output. But, if the (negative)— 42—
Table2. The Direction of the Short—Run Effects
of a Rise in Government Spending Under Fixed and
Flexible Exchange Rates: The Two—Country World
Fixed Exchange Rates Debt—Financed Tax—Financed
Effects On:
Y +(forsmall Hr) +(fora a)
+(forsmall Fr) +
r + + (forA > 0)
—(forA < 0)









Note: The signs indicated in the flexible exchange—rate part of the Table are
applicable to the case of an initial equilibrium with balanced trade and
zero initial debt. Hr and Fr denote, respectively, the negative effect




= — correspond, respectively
to the fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, and where
C =HM* N M*[F (l—ag)—H ag]. yy*rr r r— 43—
interest—rateeffect on aggregate demand is relatively weak, then both
domestic and foreign outputs rise, thereby resulting in a positive
international transmission. Finally, we note that there is no presumption
about the direction of change in money holdings (under fixed exchange
rates) and in the exchange rate (under flexible exchange rates) in
response to the debt—financed fiscal expansion. As indicated, depending
on the relative magnitudes of the domestic and foreign saving and import
propensities and the domestic and foreign sensitivities of money demand
with respect to changes in the rate of interest and income, the balance
of payments may be in a deficit or in a surplus and the currencymay
depreciate or appreciate.
The results in Table 2 also highlight the significant implication of
alternative means of budgetary finance. Indeed, in contrast with debt
finance, a tax—financed rise in government spending under a flexible
exchange rate regime leaves the world rate of interest unchanged, raises
domestic output, and depreciates the currency. The reduction in the
domestic private—sector demand for foreign output, induced by the
depreciation of the currency, precisely offsets the increased demand
induced by the rise in government spending. As a result, foreign output
remains intact and the flexible exchange rate regime fully insulates the
foreign economy from the domestic tax—financed fiscal policy. In this
case the analysis of the two—country world economy reduces to the one
carried out for the small—country case. Therefore, the long—run
multipliers for the two countries operating under flexible exchange rates
coincide with the short—run multipliers, the domestic short— and long—run
output multipliers are unity and the corresponding foreign output
multipliers are zero.— 44—
Incontrast with the flexible exchange rate regime in which the
currency depreciates to the extent needed to maintain world demand for
(and thereby the equilibrium level of) foreign output unchanged, the
fixed exchange rate regime does not contain this insulating mechanism.
As a result, the tax—financed rise in the domestic government spending
raises the world demand for (and thereby the equilibrium level of)
foreign output. On the other hand, depending on the relative magnitude
of the domestic—government import propensity, the domestic level of
ou.r'ut may rise or fall. If, however, the government import propensity
:ioes uut exceqd the corresponding private—sector propensity, then
domestic output rises and the international transmission, measured by
co—movements of domestic and foreign outputs, is positive. Finally,
since at the prevailing rate of interest domestic disposable income
falls and foreign disposable income rises, these changes in disposable
incomes alter the world demand for money and necessitate equilibrating
changes in the world rate of interest. As shown in Table 2, the change
in the world demand for money (at the prevailing rate of interest)
reflects a "transfer—problem criterion.' If the ratio of the domestic
saving to hoarding propensities, s/Mg, exceeds the corresponding foreign
ratio, s*IM** then the international redistribution of disposable income
raises the world demand for money and necessitates a rise in the world
rate of interest. The opposite holds if s/Mr falls short of s*/M**.
Independent, however, of the direction of the change in the interest rate,
the tax—financed rise in government spending must worsen the balance of
payments and lower the short—run equilibrium money holdings.— 45—
Throughoutthe exposition of the model it was assumed that
expectations are static. Since under a flexible exchange rate the actual
exchange rates do change, the assumption that exchange rate expectations
are static result in expectational errors during the period of transition
towards the long—run equilibrium. The incorporation of a consistent
expectations scheme into the Mundell—Fleming model introduces an
additional mechanism governing the short—run behavior. Aspects of this
mechanism are examined in the Appendix.
We conclude this summary with an overview of the Mundell—Flenting
model. A key characteristic of the formulation of the income—expenditure
framework underlying the Mundell—Fleming model is the lack of solid
inicroeconomic foundations underlying the behavior of the private and
public sectors, and the absence of an explicit rationale for the holdings
of zero interest—bearing money in the presence of safeinterest—bearing
bonds. The latter issue is of relevance in view of the central role
played by monetary flows in the international adjustment mechanism.
Furthermore, no attention was given to the intertemporal budget
constraints and the behavior of both the private and the public sectors
was not forward—looking in a consistent manner. As a result, there is
no mechanism ensuring that the patterns of spending, debt accumulation
and money hoarding, which are the key elements governing the equilibrium
dynamics of the economic system, are consistent with the relevant economic
constraints. The implication of this shortcoming is that in determining
the level and composition of spending, saving and asset holdings, the
private sector does not incorporate explicitly the intertemporal
consequences of government policies.— 46—
Toillustrate the significance of this issue consider a debt—
financed rise in current government spending. A proper formulation of
the government's intertemporal budget constraint must recognize that to
service the debt and maintain its solvency the government must accompany
this current fiscal expansion by either cutting down future spending or
by raising future (ordinary or inflationary) taxes. Furthermore, a proper
specification of the private sector's behavior must allow for the fact
that the forward—looking individuals may recognize the future consequences
of current government policies and incorporate these expected consequences
into their current as well as planned future spending, saving and asset
holdings.
The Mundell—Fleming model presented in this paper assumes that
producer prices are given and outputs are demand—determined. In this
framework nominal exchange rate changes amount to changes in the terms
of trade. As a result, the key characteristics of the economic system
are drastically different across alternative exchange rate regimes. More
recent theoretical research has relaxed the fixed—price assumption and
has allowed for complete price flexibility. With this flexibility prices
are always at their market clearing equilibrium levels. Accordingly,
changes in the terms of trade induced by equilibrium changes in prices
trigger an adjustment mechanism that is analogous to the one triggered by
nominal exchange rate changes in the Mundell—Fleming model.
The neglect of the intertemporal budget constraints and of the
consequences of forward—looking behavior consistent with these constraints
are among the main limitations of the model. Recognition of these
limitations provide both, the rationale for and the bridge to the growing— 47
body of newer theoretical developments aiming to rectify these
shortcomings. This newer literature develops models that are derived
from optimizing behavior consistent with the relevant temporal and
Intertemporal economic constraints. The resulting macroeconomic model
which is grounded upon solid microeconomic foundations is capable of
dealing with new issues in a consistent manner. Among these issues are
the effects of various time patterns of government spending and taxes.
The newer literature thus distinguishes between temporary and permanent
as well as between current and future policies. Likewise, it is capable
of analyzing the macroeconomic consequences of alternative specifications
of the tax structure. It can, therefore, distinguish between the effects
of different types of taxes (such as income taxes, value—added taxes and
international capital flow taxes) used to finance the budget. An
illustration of this literature is contained in Frenkel and Razin (1987).
An important feature of the modern approach is that, being grounded on
microeconomic foundations, it is capable of dealing explicitly with the
welfare consequences of economic policies. This feature reflects the
basic attribute of the macroeconomic model: the economic behavior under-
lying this model is derived from, and is consistent with, the principles
of individual utility maximization. Therefore, in contrast with the
traditional approach, the intertemporal optimizing approach provides for
a framework suitable for the normative evaluation of international
macroeconomic policies.— 48 APPENDIX I
Appendix I.Fixed Exchange Rates
1.Long—run equilibrium: the small—country case
The long—run equilibrium conditions are specified by equations (12) —
(15)of the text. Substituting the government budget constraint (15) into
equations (12) —(14)yields
(A—i) E(Y—G+M—B —rf(B'+Be),rf) +G=Y—rf(BP4B)
(A—2) (i_m)E(Y_G+M_BPrf(BP+B), rf) +(i—)G+ Y
(A—3) N(Y—G+M—B —rf(BI)IB),rf) =M
Equations (A—i) and (A—3) yield the combinations of output and private
sector debt underlying the CA =0schedule, and equations (A—2) and (A—3)
yield the combinations of these variables underlying the YY schedule.
To obtain the slope of the CA =0schedule we differentiate equations
(A—i) and (A—3) and obtain
[—s s(1+rf)—ll 1 r—(l—s)1
(A—4)
I III = I 1dM L-l÷ij[dBPJ [i-J
where s =1_Erand a = Solving(A—4) for dY/dM and dividing the
resultant solutions by each other yields the expression for dBP/dY along
the CA =0schedule. This expression is reported in equation (16) of the
text.—-
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Likewise differentiating equations (A—2) —(A—3)yields
[_(s+a) —(1+f)(l—s—a)1 [dY 1[isa1
(A—5) II11 lcM [ _(l+rf)M][Pj [ l•My]
Followinga similar procedure we obtain the expression for dBP/dY along
theYYschedule. This expression is reported in equation (17) of the
text.
To obtain the horizontal displacements of the CA =0schedule
following a balanced—budget rise in government spending we differentiate
equations (Ai) and (A—3) holding B and BP constant. Accordingly,
equation (A—i) implies that (l—s)(dY—dG+dM) =dY—dcand equation (A—3)
implies that dM =My(dYdG)/(1My).Substituting the latter expression
into the former reveals that dy/dc =1.Thus, a unit balanced—budget
rise in government spending induces a unit rightwards shift of the CA =0
schedule.
Analogously, to obtain the horizontal shift of the YY schedule we
differentiate equations (A—2) —(A—3)holding Bg and BP constant.
Equation (A—2) implies that (i—s—a)(dY—dG+dM) + (i_a)dG =dYwhere
=, andequation (A—3) implies that dM =My(dY••dG)/(1My).
Substituting the latter into the former shows that the horizontal shift
of the YY schedule Is
(l—M
1—s+a —M
Thus, in contrast with the unit rightwards displacement of the CA =0— 50—
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schedule, the unit balanced—budget rise in government spending shifts the
YY schedule to the right by less than one unit. These results underly
the diagrammatic analysis in Figures 2 and 3.
The long—run effects of fiscal policies are obtained by
differentiating the system (12) —(14)of the text and solving for the
endogenous variables. Accordingly,
—s s(l+rf)—l dY
(A—6) —(s+a) —(l+f)(l—s—a) dB
M —(l+rf)M dM
0 —s
—(l—a) dG ÷ 1—s—adT
0 M
Using this system the long—run effects of a debt—financed rise in
government spending (that is, dT =0)are
(A—7) =
[1—s—rf(s—M)]
)0 for dTt =0
dB _____ (A8) = —
(s—Mr)
0 for dTt =0
(A—9) =
My
)0 for dTt =0
where=
a—rf(s—M)> 0 under the assumption that a rise in income
worsens the current account of the balance of payments. Correspondingly,
the long—run effects of a balanced—budget rise in government spending









(s—Mr) 0 for dG =dTt
dM
(A—12) =— - M, 0 for dG =dTt
2.Short—run equilibrium: the two—country world
In this part of the Appendix we analyze the short—run equilibrium of
the system (5) —(7)in the text. This system determines the short—run
equilibrium values of Y, Y and rt. The YY and YY schedules in
Figure 4 show combinations of and which clear the markets for
domestic and foreign output, respectively. Both of these schedules
incorporate the world money—market equilibrium condition (7) of the text.
To derive the slope of the YY schedule we differentiate equations (5) and
(7) of the text. This yields





[ M, M;] LdYi [(Mr+M)]
where 11r denotes the partial (negative) effect a change in the rate of
interest on the world demand for domestic output, that is,
Hr =(l_13m)Er+eE, and where Er Mr E and M denote the partial
(negative) effects of the rate of interest on domestic and foreign
spending and money demand. To eliminate rt from the goods—market
equilibrium schedule we solve (A—13) for dYt/dr and for dY/drt, and
divide the solutions by each other. This yields— 52—
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dY i (s+a)(Mr+eM) +MyHr (A14) = alongthe YY schedule
d t ea*(Mr+eM) —M;*Hr





where Fr =niEr+e(1—3)Edenotes the partial (negative) effect of the
rate of interest on the world demand for foreign output. Applying a
similar procedure as before, the slope of the YY schedule is
* —*
dY a(M+eM)—MF
(A—16) =— r r Y r
along the YY schedule
d
e (s*+a*)(Mr+eM) ÷ M**F
A comparison of the slopes in (A—14) and (A—16) shows that there are
various possible configurations of the relative slopes of the YY and YY
schedules. However, two configurations are ruled out: if both schedules
are positively sloped then the slope of the YY cannot exceed the slope
of the YY schedule. This can be verified by noting that in the numerator
of (A—14) the negative quantity a(Mr+eM) is augmented by additional
negative quantities whereas the same negative quantity in the numerator
of (A—16) is augmented by an additional positive quantity. A similar
comparison of the denominators of (A—14) and (A—if,) shows that the
negative quantity a*(Mr+eM) is augmented by additional negative quantities
in (A—16) and by a positive quantity in (A—14). Likewise, if both
schedules are negatively sloped then, by subtracting one slope from the
other it can be verified that the Y*Y* schedule cannot be steeper than— —
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the YY schedule. These considerations imply that for all situations in.
which there is a rightwards shift of the YY schedule exceeding the
rightwards shift of the YY' schedule, the new equilibrium must be
associated with a higher level of domestic output.
A rise in the domestic government spending alters the position of
both schedules. To determine the horizontal shift of the YY schedule we
use equations (5) and (7) of the text; holding Y constant and solving
for dY/dG after eliminating the expression for dr/dG. A similar procedure
is applied to determine the horizontal shift of the Y*Y* schedule from
equations (6) and (7). Accordingly, the horizontal shifts of the
schedules induced by a debt—financed rise in government spending are
dY _____________ (A—17) =









The corresponding shifts for the tax—financed rise in government spending
are
dY _____________ (A—19) = —
MH for the YY schedule
yr s+a +—*
Mr+eMr
dY ______ (A—20) =1—
F





Comparisons of (A—17) with (A—18) and of (A—19) with (A—20) reveal the
difference between the shifts of the YY and the YY schedules.
To compute the short—run multipliers of fiscal policies we
differentiate the system (5) —(7)of the text. Thus
—(s+a) ea* Hr dY 1—s—a
(A—21) a —(s*+a*) Fr dY =
— dG+ a dTt
L MeM Mr+eM drt 0
With a debt—financed rise in government spending dTt =0and thus the
short—run effects are
(A—22)




—aH)) for dTt =0
(A—24)
t=_((s*(l_a)÷a*)M+(sa+a)M)> 0 for dTt =0
where A =s((s*+a*)(Mr+M)+M**F)+a(s*(Mr+M)+M**(F+H))
+My(s*Hr+a*(Fr+Hr))< 0
Differentiatingthe domestic demand for money function (equation (8)
of the text) and using (A—22) and (A—24) yields the short—run change in
the domestic money holdings, that is, the balance of payments:— — APPENDIXI
*
dM eM M
(A—25) = 1(J[a*+s*(a_ag)]— (a+sa)
dG M M* Mr M* rr r
+MM*MM[F(l_a) —Ha]) for dTt =0
With a balanced—budget rise in government spending dG =dTt
=dT.








+s(Mr+M))> 0 for dG =dTt e
(A—28)
t= — sM) fordG =dTt
Differentiating the domestic money demand function and using (A—26)
and (A—28) yields
dM g
(A—29) = — ((SMrM* ÷ s*eMM) +MyM*(FrlHr))< 0
for dG =dTt— 56 APPENDIXI
3.Long—run equilibrium: the two—country world
The long—run equilibrium of the system is specified by
equations (A—30) —(A—36)where the first five equations are the long—run
counterpart to the short—run conditions (5) —(9)of the text and the
last two equations are the zero—savings requirements for each country
implying (once the government budget constraint is incorporated) current
account balances. By employing a common rate of interest, this long—run
system embodies the assumption of perfect capital mobility.




+ (1—)eE*(Y*+M* +(l+r)BP/,r) =Y
(A—32) M(Y—T+M —(l+r)BP,r) +eM*(Y*lM*÷ (l+r)BP/, r) =
(A—33) M(Y—T+M —(l+r)BP,r) =M
(A—34) M*(Y*+M* +(l+r)BP/,r) =
(A35) E(Y—T+M —(l+r)BP,r) =Y—rBP—T
(A—36) E*(Y*+M* +(l+r)BP/,r) = ÷rBP/
By Wairas's Law one of the seven equations can be omitted and the
remaining six equations can be used to solve for the long—run equilibrium
values of Y, Y, BP, M, M* and r as functions of the policy variables.- 57—
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Appendix II. Flexible Exchange Rates
1.Short—run equilibrium: the two—country world
In this part of the Appendix we analyze the short—run equilibrium of
the two—country model under flexible exchange rates. Using the domestic
money market equilibrium condition (22) of the text the domestic market
clearing rate of interest is
(A—37) rt =r(Yt—Tt+At...i,M)
where a rise in disposable resources raises the equilibrium rate of
interest while a rise in the money supply lowers the rate of interest.
Similarly, using the foreign money—market clearing condition (23) of the
text but not imposing yet an equality between the foreign rate of
interest, r, and the domestic rate, r, yields
** ** *
(A—38)r =r + At_i, M )
Substituting(A—37) into the domestic expenditure function (3) of the
text and substituting (A—38) Into the corresponding foreign expenditure
function yields
(A—39)Et =E(Y—Tt+ At_i, M)
(A—40) E =? (Y+A1,M*)
Equations(A—39) —(A—40)are the reduced—form expenditure functions
which incorporate the conditions of money—market equilibrium. A rise in
disposable resources exerts two conflicting influences on the reduced—form
expenditure function. On the one hand it stimulates spending directly hut— 58—
APPENDIXII
n the ether hand, by raising the equilibrium rate of interest, it
discourages spending. ForTnally, 5 =5
—
(Er/Mr)My•In what follows we
assume that the direct effect ominates so that 5 > 0. For subsequent
use we note that the reduced—form gying propensity=
1—5exceeds
MyIl+(Er/Mr)]. This follows from the assumption that bonds are normal
goods (so that l5My > 0) together with the former expression linking
with 5.
Substituting the reduced—form expenditure functions (A—39) —(A—40)
into the good—markets clearing conditions yields
(A—41) (l_m)E(Yt_Tt +At_i,M) +(l—)G+etE*(Y+A_1,M*)
(A—42)mEtTt +At.....i,M) ++ et(l_)E*(Y+A_1,4*) =eY
where we recall that Ar_i =Mt_i(i+rt_i)_i and
=
M_1
+(i+ri)BP1/e.Thus, while Ar_i is predetermined, the
value of A_1 depends on the prevailing exchange rate. Equations
(A—41) —(A—42)are the reduced—form good—markets clearing conditions.
These conditions link the equilibrium values of domestic output, foreign
output, and the exchange rate. In the first step of the analysis we
derive the ee schedule of the text which portrays alternative combinations
of Y and Y satisfying equations (A—41) —(A—42)for alternative values
of the exchange rate (which is treated as a parameter). The slope of
this schedule is obtained by differentiating equations (A—41) —(A—42)









L _et(*+*)jl_dYJ [IMt+(l_*_*)Hjag] J
whereH =(l+rt_i)B_i/etdenotes the debt commitment of the home
country, the reduced—form saving and import propensities are designated
by a tilde ('-),andwhere IM =E*and fl1 =y*—(i_)E*are,
respectively, the foreign arid the domestic values of imports expressed
in units of foreign goods. For given fiscal policies we obtain
dYt *IM* + —IM) —
(A—44) —.z—=t t
det
dY 'IM —(IM*—IM) +[(l_.*_'*)+(l—'*)]H (A—45) —= —t t
det etL
where =*+ * + '*>0.





(A—46) — * d et[*mi +*(IM*—IM)
—*H]
along the ee schedule.
Around a trade—balance equilibrium with zero initial debt (that is,
IMt =IMand H =0)this slope is negative arid is equal to _/et*.
With the negatively sloped ee schedule a downwards movement along the
schedule (that is a rise in Y and a fall in Y) is associated with
higher values of et.— 60— APPENDIXII
To determine the effects of changes in government spending we
compute the horizontal shift of the ee schedule by setting dY =dTt
=0
in the system (A—43) and solving for dYt/dG. This yields
dY IM +g(IM*—IM)÷ [(i_*)(l_ag) —
(A—47)—= * dC IM — — IM)+[(l_*—*)+
forthe ee schedule.
Thus, around trade—balance equilibrium and zero initial debt the schedule
shifts to the right by l/.
By setting dY =dG0 and following a similar procedure, the
horizontal shift of the ee schedule induced by a unit rise in taxes is
dYt (IM —IMt)+(l—)IM÷ [(l_)(l_s*_*(l4*)]H
(A—48) —i---
= — * dt _a(IM
—114)+IM
+[(l_*_*)÷ a(l—'*)J'd
for the ee schedule.
Thus, around trade—balance equilibrium and zero initial debt schedule
shifts to the left by (l—s)/s units.
By combining the results in (A—47) —(A—48)we obtain the effect of






forthe ee schedule with dG dTt.— 61—
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Thus, around trade—balance equilibrium with zero initial debt, a
balanced—budget unit rise in government spending shifts the ee schedule
to the right by one unit.
In the second step of the diagramatic analysis we assume that Fl =0
and we derive the rr* schedule portraying combinations of Y andalong
which the money—market clearing rates of interest (under the assumption
of static exchange rate expectations) are equal across countries so that
(A—50) r(Yt —Tt+At_i,M) =r*(Y*+A1,M*).
The slope of this schedule is r/r which can also be expressed in terms
of the characteristics of the demands for money according to
dY* M M*
(A—5l) —s-= >0 along the rr* schedule.
dYt M* Mr
y*
Obviously, around r =r*, M. As is evident, the level of
government spending does not influence the rr* schedule whereas a unit
rise in taxes shifts the schedule to the right by one unit.
Formally, the effects of fiscal policies can be obtained by
differentiating the system (A—41) —(A—42)and (A—50). Thus,
(+) IM_*H dYt
(A—52) _et(*+a*) _IMt(l_**)lldY
— dG ÷ adT
My/Mr —M*/M */et de 0
My/Mr
Solving (A—52) the short—run effects of a debt—financed rise in
government spending are:— 62 APPENDIX II
dY M*















Thus, with an initial balanced trade and with zero initial debt,< 0.
Differentiating the money—market equilibrium condition (equation (8)
of the text) and using (A—53), we obtain the equilibrium change in the
rate of interest:
dr MM*
(A—56) = Y(IM +a(IM
—IM)+(l_a)H) for dTt =0
M M*rr
Likewise, the short—run efects of a tax—financed rise in government
spending are— 63
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Using the money market equilibrium condition together with (A—57) yields
dr M M* eM
(A—60) =— — INt)÷ (f(+_a) +
Mr
for dG =dTt
2.Long—run equilibrium: the two—country world
The long—run equilibrium of the system is characterized by
equations (A—61) —(A—65)where the first three equations are the long—run
counterparts to equations (A—41), (A—42) and (A50), and the last two
equations are the requirements of zero savings in both countries implying
(once the government budget constraint is incorporated) current account
balances. Embodied in the system are the requirements of money—market
equilibria and perfect capital mobility.— 64—
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(A—63) r(Y—T+M—(l+r)B ,M)=r*(Y+M +
eBP, M )




Thissystem which determines the long—run equilibrium values of Y, Y, e,
BP and r, can be used to analyze the effects of government spending and
taxes on these endogenous variables.
3.Exchange rate expectations
Up to this point we have assumed that the expectations concerning
the evolution of the exchange rate are static. This assumption implied
that the rates of interest on securities denominated in different
currencies are equalized. Since, however, the actual exchange rate does
change overtime, it is useful to extend the analysis and allow for
exchange rate expectations that are not static. Specifically, in this
part of the Appendix we assume that expectations are rational in the
sense of being self fulfilling. We continue to assume that the GDP
deflators are fixed. To illustrate the main implication of exchange- 65-
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rate expectations we consider a stripped—down version of the small—
country flexible exchange—rate model and, for expository convenience,
we present the analysis using a continuous—time version of the model.
The budget constraint can be written as
(A—66) Et +— eBt= — T—rfeB
where a dot over a variable represents a time derivative. The spending
and money—demand functions (the counterparts to equations (3) —(4)of
the text) are
(A—67) Et E(Yt_T —rfeB,
—etBt,rf)
(A—68) Mt M(Yt —Tt
— — rf + )
wherethe demand for money is expressed as a negative function of the
expected depreciation of the currency, et/et. In what follows we
simplifytheexposition by assuming that the world rate of interest, r,
isvery low (zero), and that the effect of assets (Mt —etBt)
spending is negligible. With these simplifications the goods andmoney—
market equilibrium conditions (the counterparts to equations (20') and
(22') of the text) are
(A—69) mtTt) +(l—8)G+ =
(A—70) M(Y1—T, M—etBt, --)= M— 66—
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Equation (A—69) implies that the level of output which clears the
goods market depends positively on the level of the exchange rate and on
government spending, and negatively on taxes. This dependence can be
expressed as
(A—71)t =Y(et,G, Tt)
where Yt/et =/(s+a),Yt/G (l_a)/(s+a) and YtITt =—(l—s—a)/(s+a)
are the conventional foreign trade multipliers. Substituting the functional
relation (A—71) into the money—market equilibrium condition and solving for
the (actual and expected) percentage change in the exchange rate yields






where MA and Mr denote, respectively, the derivatives of the demand for
money with respect to assets (M —etBt)and the rate of interest. The
former is positive and the latter is negative. The interpretation of the
dependence of the percentage change in the exchange rate, representing
the money—market clearing interest rate, on the various variables follows.
A rise in the exchange rate raises the goods—market clearing level of
output and raises the demand for money. To restore money—market
equilibrium the rate of interest must rise, that is, et/et must rise.— 67—
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On the other hand, the rise in e raises the domestic—currency value of
the debt Bt. If the private sector is a net creditor, the depreciation
of the currency raises the domestic—currency value of assets and raises
the demand for money. This in turn also contributes to the rise in the
rate of interest. If, however, the private sector is a net debtor then
the value of assets falls, the demand for money is reduced, thereby
contributing to a downward pressure on the rate of interest. The net
effect on the rate of interest depends, therefore, on the net debtor
position of the private sector; if, however, Bt is zero, then the rate
of Interest must rise so that f/et > 0. Analogous interpretations
apply to the other derivatives where it is evident that
< 0, f/DG 0 and f/T < •
Equation(A—72) constitutes the first differential equation of the
model governing the evolution of the exchange rate over time. The second
variable whose evolution over time characterizes the dynamics of the
system is the stock of private—sector debt. Substituting the goods—market
equilibrium condition (A—7l) into the budget constraint (A—66), using the
fact that in the absence of monetary policy =0we can solve for the
dynamics of private—sector debt. Accordingly,
(A—73) = h(et,G, T)
= (Et[Y(et,G, Tt) —Tt}—Y(et,G, Tt) +T)
Equation (A—73) expresses the rate of change of private—sector debt as
the difference between private—sector spending and disposable income.— 68—
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The previous discussion implies that h/ae =— s/(s+a)< 0,
3h/G=_(1_a)s/(s+a)< 0 and 3h/aT =s/(s+a)> 0.
In interpreting these expressions we note that the function h
represents the negative savings of the private sector. Accordingly,
a unit rise in et or C raises savings by the saving propensity times the
corresponding multiplier. Analogously, a unit rise in taxes which lowers
disposable income, lowers savings by the saving propensity times the
corresponding disposable—income multiplier.
The equilibrium of the system is exhibited in Figure A—l. The
positively sloped et =0schedule shows combinations of the exchange rate
and private—sector debt which maintain an unchanged exchange rate. The
schedule represents equation (A—72) for et =0.Its slope is positive
around a zero level of private sector debt and its position depends on
the policy variables G, Tt and M. Likesse the =0locus represents
equation (A—73) for =0.It is horizontal since, as specified, the
rate of change of private—sector debt does not depend on the value of
debt. The arrows around the schedules indicate the directions in which
the variables tend to move, and the solid curve shows the unique saddle
path converging towards a stationary state. As customary in this type of
analysis we associate this saddle path with the equilibrium path. The
long—run equilibrium of the system is shown by point A In Figure A—i
where, for convenience, we show a case in which the long—run value of
private—sector debt is zero.
The effects of a unit debt—financed rise in government spending from
G0 to Cj are shown in Figure A—2. Starting from an initial long—run
equilibrium at point A, the rise in G shifts the 0 schedule from— 68a—
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point A downwards by —(l—a)/D and it also shifts the e =0schedule from
point A downwards by _(l_a)/My. For M < 1 the vertical displacement
of the e =0schedule exceeds the corresponding displacement of the
Bt =0schedule and the new long—run equilibrium obtains at point C at
which the domestic currency has appreciated and private—sector debt has
risen. The short—run equilibrium obtains at point B along the new saddle
path and transition towards the long run follows along the path connecting
points B and C. As is evident the initial appreciation of the currency
overshoots the long—run appreciation.
The effects of a unit tax—financed rise in government spending are
shown in Figure A—3. With dG =dT,the Bt =0schedule shifts upwards
by a/* while the e =0schedule shifts vertically by (s+a_a)/M. The
benchmark case shown in Figure A—3 corresponds to the situation in which
the private sector and the government have the same marginal propensities
to spend on domestic goods (that is, 5+a =as).In that case the e =0
remains intact, the short—run equilibrium is at point B and the long—run
equilibrium is at point C. As seen in this case the domestic currency
depreciates and the short—run depreciation undershoots the long—run
depreciation. These results are sensitive to alternative assumptions,
concerning the relative magnitudes of (s+a) and ag.— 69a— APPENDIXII
FigureA-3: The Effects of A
Tax-Financed Rise in Government
Spending on the Paths
of the Exchange Rate
and Private-Sector Debt
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